An overlapping generations model of marriage and divorce is constructed to analyze family structure and intergenerational mobility. Agents differ by sex, marital status, and human capital. Single agents meet in a marriage market and decide whether to accept or reject proposals to wed. Married couples must decide whether to separate or not. Parents invest in their children depending on their wherewithal. A simulated version of the theoretical prototype can generate an equilibrium with a significant number of femaleheaded families and a high degree of persistence in income across generations. To illustrate the model's mechanics, the effects of two antipoverty policies, namely child support and welfare, are investigated.
I. Introduction
On what basis do people choose to get married and divorced? How do they decide on the amount of time and resources to invest in their children?
To what extent do the making and breaking of couples influence intergenerational mobility? How do different types of antiHelpful comments from Sherwin Rosen, Aloysius Siow (who was a referee), and another referee are gratefully acknowledged. As the final touches were being placed on the first draft of this paper, S. Rao Aiyagari was taken from the profession. His career was just beginning to wax. Who knows how brilliant the light would have been that shone from him? It is an honor to have worked with Rao. He is missed. It is hoped that some of his spirit lives on here. One interpretation is that he no longer cares about his offspring. Another, more charitable, one is that he no longer enjoys the benefit from living with them.
B. Household Production
Household production for a married couple is given by c = Y(l, n; x, z, y) -(xl + zn) -y. 
where e-I and e-2 indicate the human capital investment during the two periods of an agent's childhood. The distribution functions E and A are stochastically increasing in e-2 + e-I in the sense of firstorder stochastic dominance. Thus higher human capital investment in children by parents increases the likelihood that children will be successful in life. Let the conditional distribution E be represented by a discrete approximation, a la Tauchen (1986) , to a lognormal distribution with mean ,le and standard deviation axie. Similarly, suppose that A is also given by a discrete approximation to a lognormal with mean j,ule and standard deviation azle. These conditional means are given by 14xle = E(e-2 + e-1), gzle = Cz + E(e2 + e1), where E is the parameter governing the technology that maps human capital investment into productivity levels. After the first period of adulthood the productivity levels for females and males evolve according to the following transition functions: Similarly, let n = Nm(x, z, y) represent the decision rule that obtains from the married male's problem:
Mm(x, z, y) = max M(c, e, 1 -n) P(2) n subject to c= Y(Lm(x, z, y), n; x, z, y) and e = Q(Tm(x, z, y), c).
Observe that decisions within a family are determined noncooperatively by the maximizing behavior of agents in a Nash equilibrium. Here Fm(x, z, y) and Mm(x, z, y) give the equilibrium utility levels obtained in a marriage between a type x female and a type z male. Denote the equilibrium level of human capital investment in a twoparent family by e = Em(x, z, y) = Q(Tm(x, z, y), Y(Lm(x, z, y), Nm(x, z, y); x, z, y)). Finally, the maximized utility of a single male is given by the following problem:
Ms(z) = max M(c, 0, 1 -n) P(4) n subject to c= S(n; z).
Let n = Ns(z) be the optimal work decision for a single male.
C. Search
Let the odds of drawing a single age j female of type xi in the marriage market be represented by In equilibrium the distributions of two-period-old males and females that will be around next period in the marriage market, or 2 and Q2, will depend on the distributions of one-period-old males and females that are around this period, or (D1 and Q 1. Express this dependence by (V, Q2) = P (cD1, Q 1). A key step in the analysis will be to compute such matching probabilities. Now, consider an age i couple indexed by (x, z, y). Both parties face a decision: should they choose married or single life for the period? Let the female's expected lifetime utility associated with this match in marriage be denoted by W(x, z, 7) and her expected lifetime utility from single life be represented by Gi (x; ). Clearly, a married female will want to remain married if and only if W(x, z, y) ' Gi(x; .); otherwise, it is in her best interest to get a divorce. Equally as clearly, a single female will desire to marry if and only if LhF(7h) Wi(X, z, Yh) ? Gi(x; .); otherwise, she will go it alone. Similarly, let the male's expected lifetime utility from married life be given by Hi (x, z, 7) and the value of being single be Bi (z; . Jl(x, z; CD1, Q1), andJs(x, z) are described by P(5) in conjunction with V(1), V(2), V(3), and V(4). 5. Married agents' accept/reject choices Im'(x, z, y) andJm'(x, z, y) are described by P(6).
4Given the forms of problems P(1), P(2), and P(3), the functions Em and Es do not change over time.
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6. The matching probabilities (D1 (x), ?D2(x), Q1 (z), and Q2 (z) are governed by the stationary distributions described by (4) and (5).
While not much can be said about the model at a general level, a feel for the forces at play can be gleaned by solving it numerically and conducting comparative statics exercises. This is the subject of the next section.
V. A Numerical Example
In order to solve the model numerically, values must be assigned to the model's various parameters.5 Table 1 lists the parameter values used. Note that at this time very little is known about the appropriate choice of parameter values, or functional forms, to use in a model such as this. Given that the primary interest here is to illustrate the mechanics of the model developed, these parameter values are picked to find a benchmark equilibrium that displays several features of interest. These features will be discussed now. Beforehand, note that the benchmark equilibrium presupposes that a divorced male must pay 10 percent of his current income in child support to his former spouse. Furthermore, single women who do not work are eligible to receive a welfare payment amounting to 22 percent of average income in the economy. These two policies are discussed in more detail later on.
The marital status of the population is shown in table 2. At any point in time, about 22.5 percent of people are not married, either because they have never married or are divorced. The matching shock plays an important role in generating divorce in the second period of life. When the variance of the matching shock is set to zero (leaving its mean value unchanged), the percentage of divorces falls from 9.1 to 3.8 percent. Some people will still choose to divorce, either because the extra income generated from a marriage cannot cover the fixed cost (note that the mean value of the match shock is positive) or because they can do better on welfare.6 Figure 1 shows the matching set for young agents in the model. Recall that a marriage occurs when the product of the male and female indicator functions returns a value of one; otherwise no marriage occurs. As can be seen, nobody wants to marry a mate with low 'The algorithm used to compute the competitive equilibrium under study is detailed in Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (1999). 6 It is interesting that letting divorced males realize utility from their children increases the number of divorces in the model. Now there is less of a utility cost from divorce. productivity-the exception being very rich males, who will marry any woman. These people are unattractive to the opposite sex. The fact that women tend to select the best men has been discussed in the labor economics literature. For example, Cornwell and Rupert (1997) find that married men earn more than unmarried ones; this is often called the marriage premium. They argue that the same traits that make a man attractive to a woman, such as ability, ambition, dependability, determination, and honesty, are also valued by employers. To an outside observer, marriage would be a signal, so to speak, of the quality of a man. In any event, this type of selection effect is a natural outcome within the context of a bilateral search model.
In contrast, consider a world in which men and women face no search frictions when finding their first mate. Here household production is maximized by choosing a mate with the highest productivity. Again, some people may still choose to remain single, however, because they do better on welfare. Now, only 2.6 percent of people fail to marry when young. These agents are the worst types. Not surprisingly, there is perfect assortative mating among the married population. Approximately 9.9 percent of people divorce when old because of bad match quality shocks or changes in types. There is considerable income inequality in the benchmark equilibrium. The wage distributions for males and females are approximately lognormal with a standard deviation for wages of 52 percent.8 The standard deviations for male and female expected lifetime incomes are about 40 and 36 percent. As one would expect, family income is lowest for unmarried females. This occurs for two reasons: first, these are single-income families, and second, they tend to be at the lower end of the productivity distribution. Family income for females by marital status is given in table 3. Unmarried females have about 31-47 percent of their married counterparts' family incomes.
In the model, married females spend more time with their children and less time working than either single or divorced females do (see table 4). This is not surprising since a two-parent family can rely on the income that the male brings into the household. The mother in a two-parent family then uses some of her freed-up time to invest in her children, from which both parents realize utility. Note that married females enjoy more leisure. A welfare mother spends no time working but invests the most time in her children. She also enjoys the most leisure.9 How much intergenerational income mobility is there in the model? The correlation between parents' and their offspring's lifetime family income is about .53 for sons and .32 for daughters, showing a fairly high degree of persistence in income across generations. Children who come from low-income families suffer from a lack of human capital investment. They, too, then tend to be poor when they grow up. This occurs for two reasons. First, the low level of human capital investment leads to low productivity levels for these individuals. Thus they can earn less in the labor market. Second, the low productivity levels make them relatively unattractive mates 9 It is interesting that allowing for a variable labor supply dramatically affects the equilibrium number of marriages, other things equal. Suppose that market work for working men and that for working women are held fixed at their mean levels. Still assume that women on welfare do not work. Fix child care time for women at its mean level. The equilibrium number of marriages rises by 19 percentage points to 97 percent. The question is, Why? First, divorce is much less attractive for a woman. Single women who are not on welfare work the most in the benchmark equilibrium (see table 4). They cannot make up now for the lost family income by working more. Marriage is now more attractive for men. Married women work the least in the benchmark equilibrium, and their husbands would like them to work more. They do now. The impact of childhood history on the expected earnings for a female is presented in table 5. Consider the fate of a girl who spends all of her life in a single-parent family vis-a-vis one who grows up in a two-parent household. The child from the broken home can expect to realize, when she grows up, about two-thirds of the family income of the child from an intact one.
In general, multiple equilibria may be a problem in two-sided search models, a point highlighted in Burdett and Coles (1997) and Burdett and Wright (1998). Indeed, for the parameterization employed, one other equilibrium was found. This is an equilibrium in which everybody marries in the first period. There is no reason to remain single in the first period if everyone else is getting married in the first period. This transpires because there is no option value to waiting; there will be no eligible mates next period. In this equilibrium some agents still get divorced, though, because their match is poor in that the couple drew a bad value for y. It is interesting that average expected income and lifetime utility are higher in this equilibrium than in the benchmark one.11 Income inequality is lower, too. This equilibrium is not stable, however, in the sense that when the economy is started off from a variety of other initial distributions 10 The extent of persistence in the type shock plays an important role in a young agent's decision to marry or not. It can now be explained why. To this end, suppose that type shocks are permanent. Therefore, an agent's type does not change over time. Now, 99 percent of young agents remain single! Since type is permanent, there is less incentive to marry a low type: there is no chance that he or she can improve. So the value of waiting to find a new mate increases. There are now more single women in equilibrium, and consequently, there is less investment in children. This, in turn, causes the long-run quality of young adults to suffer. The drop in the quality of the mating pool then leads to fewer marriages.
11 Average expected lifetime income is 27 percent higher in the equilibrium in which everybody gets married in the first period.
(some extremely close to the equilibrium in which everyone marries), it always converges to the benchmark equilibrium.
To illustrate the mechanics of the prototype general equilibrium search model of marriage and divorce developed here, two policy experiments will now be conducted. Policy makers have tried to protect the welfare of children by making divorced fathers pay child support and by providing state aid to destitute single mothers. Each of these policies will be examined in turn.
A. Child Support
How does child support work in the model? Each divorced mother would now receive the fraction a of her former spouse's income as child support. Thus the budget constraint for a divorced female of type x who was married to a man whose current income is S(n, z) would now be c = D(l, x) + aS(n, z), whereas that of her ex-spouse appears as c = (1 -a)S(n, z).
Note that with the introduction of child support the current income of her ex-husband becomes a relevant state variable for a divorced female. Likewise, for a single male in the second period of his life, it will matter whether or not he was married in the first period.
The direct effect of child support is, of course, to increase the living standards of children living in single-parent families. Their mothers now have more resources to invest in them. There are indirect effects as well. First, the necessity of paying child support makes divorce less attractive to males: in the model, males are the party most likely to walk from a marriage. Second, the uplifting effect that child support has on investment in children from single-parent families makes them better mates in the marriage market. This reduces the incidence of divorce when these children grow up.
Raising child support from 10 to 15 percent improves the model economy's long-run health. Lifetime earnings for a child raised in a family that suffered through a divorce rise by about 5.3 percent. More is invested in these children. Furthermore, the number of children living in a family that has experienced a divorce drops by about one percentage point. There are now three percentage points fewer children living with a single parent in equilibrium because divorce has been dissuaded and the quality of the mating pool has improved. Both of these effects lead to a 5.6 percent increase in average lifetime earnings for males and females taken as whole. As can be seen from JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY figure 2, the income distributions for the economy with a 15 percent child support rate stochastically dominate the ones that occur when the economy has a 10 percent rate. Expected lifetime utility increases by about 8.1 percent, when measured in consumption units.'2 It may seem paradoxical that males are better off in the equilibrium with a higher rate of child support. Child support acts as a tax on male divorcees. Furthermore, a divorced male also realizes no utility from his offspring. So, at first glance, it may appear that males should be worse off from the higher rate of child support. To understand the mechanisms at work, it pays to artificially decompose the experiment into short-and long-run effects. For the short-run effects, consider the impact on males when the distribution of young agents is held fixed; that is, the induced changes in human capital investments by parents are not allowed to affect the type distribution of children. Now, indeed, males do suffer a slight loss in expected income and utility. Lifetime expected income for males falls by about 0.1 percent. The small size of this number should not be surprising. First, the rate of child support was raised by only five percentage points. Second, only about 9 percent are divorced in the initial equilibrium. Third, a divorced male will pay child support for only one-half of his life, and this will be discounted by a factor of 0. 16 Moffitt (1992) notes that the welfare system has generated nontrivial work disincentives (but not of the magnitude needed to explain female poverty). 17 The connection between welfare and family structure is not well understood. While recent empirical work does find a positive association between the number of single mothers and AFDC benefits, the size of the effect is not large enough to explain the postwar rise in female headship. rate of income taxation reduces the income available to a married couple, and this again reduces the attractiveness of marriage. Which effects dominate is a quantitative question (and the answer obtained could obviously hinge on the particular structure employed). The economy with welfare will now be compared to one without it.
Welfare allows single mothers to spend more time with their children, at least in the model. Welfare mothers spend about 18 percent of their time on child care, as opposed to the 8 percent spent by single mothers in the economy with welfare. As a result, the level of human capital in children from single-parent families increases. These children are better off. The lifetime utility distribution for women is plotted in figure 3 . There are fewer suffering women in an economy with welfare. This increase in the utility of the lower strata of women comes about primarily from a gain in leisure. This can be gleaned from the after-tax income distribution for women. with the introduction of welfare. This experiment makes it clear that precise information about key parameters, such as 62, will be needed for conducting policy analysis. Therefore, a key step in the evolution of dynamic general equilibrium models of marriage and divorce will be determining appropriate parameter values to use. Perhaps parameters such as 62 could be estimated from time-use data. Clearly, this is required before any serious policy analysis can be done.
Transitional Dynamics
While in the long run the economy is better off without welfare, in the sense that expected lifetime utility is higher, rescinding welfare could have painful effects in the short run. So, what does the transition path look like when one moves from the benchmark equilibrium with welfare to the new steady state without it? The welfare gain for each generation of young women along the transition path is plotted in figure 4. As can be seen, a young woman's expected lifetime utility drops by about 5.5 percent (measured in consumption units) initially. It takes at least 15 periods (and a period here is 10 years) before women can expect to be as well off under the new regime as under the old one."8 And the gains, since they occur well off into the future, will be discounted heavily. Males are better off along the transition path, however, in that each generation realizes a higher level of expected lifetime utility than in the benchmark economy. Even the initial generations gain about a 5 percent increase in welfare. Income inequality worsens initially. As figure 4 illustrates, the number of people at the low end of the income distribution rises quite dramatically when welfare is first removed. Thus taking transitional dynamics into account may significantly alter the welfare effects of public policy.
VI. Conclusion
A family's rung on the economic ladder is quite persistent across generations. Divorce is usually associated with a significant drop in the material well-being of a woman. Children from single-parent families are less likely to be successful than ones living with two parents. To address these observations, a prototype overlapping generations model of marriage, divorce, and investment in children is constructed. In the model there are males and females, who may differ from one another according to their marital status and level of hu-18 Since the number of single agents falls immediately following the elimination of welfare, there may be some unhappily married females in the short run. To illustrate the workings of the model, two policy experiments are tried: child support and welfare. Child support has two effects: it increases the living standard for children living in single-parent families and it discourages fathers from abandoning their families. An increase in child support results in more marriages, fewer divorces, and fewer single-parent families. In the experiment run, it unambiguously lifts up society's income distribution, in the sense that the new income distribution stochastically dominates the old one. Welfare allows single parents to spend more time with their children, which is good for their offspring's human capital development. It encourages women to choose single life and to withdraw from the labor force in order to gain leisure, however, at least in the experiment conducted. As a consequence, welfare is found to increase the well-being of children from single-parent families, but it also leads to fewer marriages, a higher number of divorces, and a greater incidence of single-parent families. While the equilibrium distribution of women's utilities is better at the low end, it is worse everywhere else, and it has a lower average value. Additionally, the model suggests that the transitional dynamics associated with policy changes may take a long time to work themselves through the system. While in the long run a woman's expected lifetime utility may be higher in the economy without welfare, in the short run (which may be agonizingly long), this need not be the case, as is illustrated. Finally, the numbers reported in the experiments are presented to illustrate how a model such as this works and what it can be used for. They are not intended to do service in public policy debates. The numerical results may well be sensitive to the parameter values imposed and functional forms adopted. A key step in the development of models such as this will be pinning down an appropriate parameterization to use. Furthermore, the structure of the theoretical prototype developed here is still crude, as will now be discussed.
There are many potential ways to improve the primitive nature of the framework used here. And any serious policy analysis would demand improvements. First, more periods could be added to the framework. This may be important for two reasons. Turnover in the marriage market may be sensitive to the number of periods there JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
are. An individual could be more likely to remain single or to divorce if he or she believes that there will be lots of opportunities to find another mate. Also, at any point in time, most people in the United States do not have dependent children. A natural way to do this in the model is to extend the time horizon to include periods without children, such as retirement. This may moderate the welfare gains from family policy. Second, adding savings could make the framework more interesting. As discussed, the risks of divorce are large. Individuals could self-insure against its consequences by accumulating assets. This possibility may lower the welfare gains from public policy aimed at reducing the deleterious effects of divorce. Whether allowing for tangible wealth will promote or dissuade marriage is hard to tell in advance. On the one hand, the presence of tangible wealth makes divorce more attractive since it eases its burden; on the other hand, this may make marriage more attractive because it is less costly to dissolve.'9 Third, other models of household decision making may describe the behavior of families more accurately. Perhaps, for example, a husband and wife arrive at their decisions via Nash bargaining, or they care about a child's welfare as opposed to the level of human capital investments they make. Fourth, a fertility decision could be added. It is natural to believe that the decisions to marry and have offspring are connected. This also may moderate the welfare gains from public policy since any resources directed to families may be partially dissipated through larger family size (see Knowles 1999) 20 probability that a one-period-old type xi female will be married is therefore given by 
